The Chicago Sun-Times ran an article on Friday night that reported:
Chicago taxpayers could be on the hook for a $29 million shortfall in hotel tax revenues needed to retire Soldier Field renovation bonds thanks to the pandemic’s lingering impact on hotels.
That sounds bad, and it’s certainly not good. But allow me to argue that it doesn’t actually mean that the $660 million renovation of the Bears‘ Soldier Field — really its demolition and the construction of a whole new stadium inside its outer walls — just cost taxpayers an extra $29 million, even if the city of Chicago is now going to have to come up with an extra $29 million from somewhere. It sounds confusing, and it’s a little counterintuitive, but it’s important for understanding who pays for what in the grand scheme of things.
When the city of Chicago agreed to help fund a $660 million rebuild of the stadium in 2001, it did so by having the state stadium authority sell $399 million in construction bonds. (Some additional city costs raised the total public price tag to $432 million.) To pay these off, the state extended a 2% city hotel tax that was originally used to build the White Sox‘ new stadium in 1991, and which was set to expire.
To cover the bond cost with the hotel tax money, the city and state assumed that hotel tax revenues would rise by 5.5% a year. Which it has mostly, but not always: In 2011, the state made up a $1.1 million shortfall (for both the Bears and subsequent White Sox renovations by tapping its state income tax revenues; and last year, thanks to COVID, hotel tax revenues fell a whopping $22 million short, something the Illinois legislature managed by refinancing the bonds, a procedure known by the adorably obfuscatory name of “scoop-and-toss.” Now, with hotel stays still in the toilet, the state needs to find another $29 million, and isn’t yet sure where it will come from.
Again, that sounds bad, but notice what just happened in the course of those last two paragraphs. The city of Chicago took on $432 million in costs for subsidies to the Bears, and levied a hotel tax surcharge to pay for them. The hotel tax surcharge fell short — and then was blamed for causing the costs to go up, even though Chicagoans (and other Illinoisans) are paying the same $432 million regardless.
The problem here is a kind of magical thinking that takes place when a particular tax stream is assigned to a stadium project. If Chicago had not chosen to redo Soldier Field in 2001, it could have done a lot of things with that hotel tax surcharge: allowed it to expire, kept it in place and used it for something else, lowered it, raised it, whatever. But that’s entirely separate from taking on $432 million in debt. (Except for the $432 million in debt being the excuse for the hotel tax, obviously.) It’s not like the city and state were taxing new hotel revenue that resulted from the Bears getting a new stadium — Soldier Field’s capacity actually went down by about 5,000 seats in the rebuild, so if anything fewer out-of-town fans were likely coming to Chicago to watch Bears games. This was just a matter of hiking hotel taxes with one hand, and doling it out to the Bears owners with the other.
This may sound like a boring semantic discussion that only economists and economics journalists care about, but it’s actually really important, because it can change how one views the success or failure of stadium funding. When a tax stream assigned to a stadium comes in faster than expected, it’s not uncommon to see celebratory headlines about how the stadium will be paid off early; when there’s a bad year for whatever taxes got put in the “4 new stadium” bucket, like now with Soldier Field, it’s seen as an added cost. And, of course, there’s the relentless focus in some corners of the New York Times on stadiums that are torn down before their debt is paid off, which is supposed to be some kind of travesty.
It’s more instructive, though, to think of a stadium financing scheme as two separate pieces: first borrowing a whole pile of money to pay for construction, then finding a way to pay for it. But while it may suck for step two to run into trouble, you’re still paying the exact same amount for what you borrowed — just like if you plan to pay off your mortgage with the proceeds from your new job, and then you lose your job and have to instead pay it off by dipping into your savings, sell blood, etc., that’s unfortunate but completely regardless of what you paid to buy your house, which remains the same.
Anyway, sorry to take up so much of your Monday morning with this, but it is an important concept to wrap your brain around, in part because it cuts both ways: When tax revenues designated for a stadium come in faster than expected, that’s good news for the government (yay more tax revenues!), but really just means that taxpayers are paying more money toward the project now to keep from having to pay it later. And when revenues fall short, yes, taxpayers are “on the hook,” but they were anyway, they just were taking the money from a different tax pocket. Keep your eyes on the spending, and not how the financing works, and you’ll have a lot clearer view of who’s shouldering the actual costs of sports subsidies — clearer than you may have before, and certainly clearer than the Chicago Sun-Times.